THE MONTH
After a January that was completely dominated by a single
issue, Trump’s government shutdown over his border wall, February reverted to form, as
“breaking news” erupted almost daily across a range of issues. If you can find a narrative for the month, it
was the interweaving of three themes: Trump
continuing to torture himself on immigration with his wildly unpopular “national
emergency” declaration; Trump pivoting to foreign affairs (to change the
subject) and coming up empty; and more shocking revelations from various
Russia-and-more investigations just ahead of the release of the Mueller
report. The month ended in utterly epic
fashion with Michael Cohen testifying against Trump for three days on Capitol
Hill, while Trump fumed helplessly from Vietnam, in the midst of doomed denuclearization
negotiations.
You can blame Mitch McConnell, to some extent, for the
“national emergency” declaration, as McConnell vowed to support Trump on that
step in return for getting Trump’s signature on the bi-partisan budget accord
that averted yet another shutdown.
McConnell was faced with an exceedingly distasteful choice – either
preside over the next shutdown, which clearly would be even more unpopular than
the first one, or allow Trump to usurp Congressional appropriations authority
via the national emergency route. He
went with Door #2.
His thought process, one suspects, is that the courts (including the GOP-friendly Supreme Court) will rule against the national emergency
– and congressional appropriation prerogatives will remain intact. But that is quite a gamble. If the Roberts/Thomas/Alito/Gorsuch/Kavanaugh coalition backs the president, McConnell
will be hoist on its own petard. He
considers the Gorsuch and Kavanaugh appointments to be his legacy; one
can’t miss the irony if they back Trump in usurping the Congress, and clear the way for future Democratic presidents to declare similar national emergencies (with more validity) on climate change, gun control, healthcare, poverty and the like.
The opposition forces moved quickly to counter the "national emergency": on the legislative
front, the House voted "against," with 13 GOP representatives
joining the Dems. The Senate now has
roughly two weeks to put it to a vote, and there have already been three GOP
defections (out of four required, assuming the Dems hold as a unit) to achieve
a full Congressional turndown. Trump
will presumably veto the turndown, since he likely has enough GOP support to
withstand an override. But the legal track is underway as well, 16 states have filed lawsuits
against Trump’s action to begin what will be a lengthy court process.
Presidents traditionally turn to foreign affairs to
distract the voting public from domestic messiness, and Trump was handed an
easy one (politically) with the unrest in Venezuela. The crisis there was precipitated when the
January 10 re-election of incumbent strongman Nicolas Maduro was declared void
by the head of the legislature, Juan Guaido, who declared himself the president
instead. Trump, somewhat
uncharacteristically, back Guaido over the strongman, and there was a rare
moment of unity as virtually all U.S. and western policy makers aligned against
Maduro.
But the other Trump-initiated foreign policy efforts, with
China on trade and North Korea on their nuclear arsenal, fared less well. The backdrop was the general feeling was that
Trump was being played in both negotiations.
While the China trade deal is still being negotiated, it is difficult to
see why China would fundamentally alter their economic infrastructure to
placate a president who could very well be gone within two years. Trump’s declaration of an extension of the
talks may be because, as he states, they are making progress. Or, it could simply be a delaying tactic that
could be demonstrating precisely the opposite.
In any event, Trump’s deadline for making a deal came and went.
North Korea offered no such extension opportunity. Trump rushed into Summit Two with even less
preparation than the first summit. He
had been warned by his staff that North Korea was quite dug in on their demands
which were, essentially, relief on sanctions before any denuclearization
occurred. This position happens to be
the mirror image of the U.S. position, with a chasm in between. Anyone in America could have advised Trump of
the same, since Director of National Intelligence Dan Coates publicly made the
same general case in congressional testimony that enraged Trump (and started
loud rumors of Coates’ perilous hold on his job).
Thus it was no real surprise that the summit ended almost
as soon as it started. The failure was
so dramatic that Trump actually earned some points simply for not agreeing to
some horrendous face-saving deal, such as, say, ending the Korean War (something
North Korea badly wants) in return for, well, absolutely nothing. But whatever
goodwill Trump might have scored be declining to do an insanely bad deal was
quickly mitigated by his absolutely revolting support of North Korea’s
murderous dictator in the hideous Otto Warmbier affair. Trump once again
accepted the strongman’s insistence that he was not involved, much the same as
Trump accepting the denials of Putin (on election meddling) and the Crown
Prince (on the Khashoggi murder). One
can only imagine what the Warmbier’s are thinking.
Michael Cohen’s public testimony to the House Committee on Oversight
and Government Reform was, essentially, the first compelling public testimony
of any kind in the entire Russia-gate set of investigations, since Mueller and
the Southern District of New York have conducted their investigations privately
while the GOP-controlled Congress refused to do any serious investigating. Cohen did not disappoint. What have we come to when a third-rate, slime
ball felon like Cohen shows more decorum and credibility under congressional
interrogation than our last nominee to the Supreme Court, Brett Kavanaugh?
The GOP representatives spent virtually every minute of
their allotted time discrediting Cohen, who was certainly an easy and deserving
target. Having said that, Cohen’s cogent
description of Trump’s attitudes and methods of operation rang true. Cohen, who
has every incentive not to lie (he
could only expose himself to a longer jail sentence), offered up evidence
(including a check signed by Trump, part of the Stormy Daniels payment), juicy tidbits
about Roger Stone, and enough bread crumbs to keep the Democrats busy for quite
a while, including Cohen’s indication that the White House lawyers reviewed and
edited the script that included the lies he told Congress in the first place.
Particularly intriguing were Cohen’s specificity around the
sordid scheme to pay off Daniels; his revelation that he knew of illegal
matters on other topics that he could not discuss since they were the subject
of other investigations (a clear reference to New York); and an unforgettable
insider view of the monster of a man he served for a decade. Cohen painted a portrait of a man, Trump, who
manages his affairs with the sordid dexterity of a mob boss, holds racial views
that David Dukes would cheer, and treats both the IRS and his own wife with
contempt. It was almost numbing to
discover that Trump’s standard line about why he did not disclose his taxes –
because he was still under audit – turns out to be the exact opposite of the
truth. The real reason, Cohen said
Trump had told him, was because Trump wanted to avoid triggering an audit. The
logical extension of this discussion stunned everyone. Trump’s claim that the audit prevented him
from releasing his taxes had long been viewed as absurd, but it simply hadn’t
occurred to anyone that Trump was actually not
undergoing an audit at all. Cohen
said that he, Cohen, tried to find evidence of such an audit, and could not.
And so it goes. It’s
become axiomic that Trump likely has more to fear from the Southern District of
New York than Mueller, yet this is quite a statement because Mueller seems to
have the goods, at the very least, on the Stormy Daniels campaign-lawbreaking
scheme. And if Trump believed that the
long-awaited release of the Mueller report would end his troubles, he surely
understands that is far from the truth, as the SDNY grinds on and the Democrats
are just getting started.
The bang of Michael Cohen’s public testimony, combined with
the whimper of the North Korea talks, surely left the Trump Administration
facing one of its lowest moments, with plenty of investigations ahead and no
clear catalyst to improve Trump’s fortunes (such as a North Korea or China
deal) readily apparent.
TRUMP APPROVAL RATING
Trump’s approval rating ticked down another point for the
third straight month, to 41% for February versus 44% in November. There has not been much “winning” in
Trumpworld as of late, and while these drops are minor, they are not
immaterial. It is hard to imagine Trump
regaining office in 2020 with a 41% approval rating (unless Howard Schulz
becomes a factor), and Trump is running out of catalysts to get him into the
45%+ zone that is the minimal entry point to have a shot at reelection.
TRUMP MONTHLY APPROVAL RATING
|
||||||||
2017
|
2018
|
2019
|
||||||
Jan
|
Jun
|
Dec
|
Jan
|
Jun
|
Dec
|
Jan
|
Feb
|
|
Approve
|
45
|
40
|
39
|
41
|
42
|
43
|
42
|
41
|
Disapprove
|
44
|
55
|
56
|
55
|
53
|
53
|
54
|
55
|
Net
|
1
|
-15
|
-17
|
-13
|
-10
|
-10
|
-12
|
-14
|
TRUMPOMETER
The “Trumpometer” declined from January to February, from
+23 to +17. The Dow and consumer
confidence recovered sharply, but the economy slowed (with the Q4 GDP at 2.6%
versus the 3.4% pace of Q3) and gas prices rose. The +17 Trumpometer reading means that, on
average, our five economic measures are +17% higher than they were at the time
of Trump’s Inauguration (with more explanation of methodology below).
TRUMPOMETER
|
End
Clinton 1/20/2001
|
End
Bush 1/20/2009
|
End
Obama 1/20/2017 (Base = 0)
|
Trump 1/31/2019
|
Trump 2/28/2019
|
% Chg. Vs. Inaug. (+ = Better)
|
Trumpometer
|
25
|
-53
|
0
|
23
|
17
|
17%
|
Unemployment Rate
|
4.2
|
7.8
|
4.7
|
4.0
|
4.0
|
15%
|
Consumer Confidence
|
129
|
38
|
114
|
120
|
131
|
16%
|
Price of Gas
|
1.27
|
1.84
|
2.44
|
2.34
|
2.47
|
-1%
|
Dow Jones
|
10,588
|
8,281
|
19,732
|
25,000
|
25,916
|
31%
|
GDP
|
4.5
|
-6.2
|
2.1
|
3.4
|
2.6
|
24%
|
Notes
on methodology:
BTRTN calculates our
monthly approval ratings using an average of the four pollsters who conduct
daily or weekly approval rating polls: Gallup Rasmussen, Reuters/Ipsos and You
Gov/Economist. This provides consistent and accurate trending information and
does not muddy the waters by including infrequent pollsters. The outcome tends to mirror the RCP average
but, we believe, our method gives more precise trending.
For
the generic ballot (which is not polled in this post-election time period), we
take an average of the only two pollsters who conduct weekly generic ballot
polls, Reuters/Ipsos
and You Gov/Economist, again for trending consistency.
The Trumpometer aggregates a set of
economic indicators and compares the resulting index to that same set of
aggregated indicators at the time of the Trump Inaugural on January 20, 2017,
on an average percentage change basis... The basic idea is to demonstrate
whether the country is better off economically now versus when Trump took
office. The indicators are the unemployment rate, the Dow-Jones
Industrial Average, the Consumer Confidence Index, the price of gasoline, and
the GDP.
No comments:
Post a Comment
Leave a comment